This paper evaluates with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. To this effect it uses an the integrated assessment CWS model. After a reminder of the two game theoretical stability notions involvednamely, core-stability and internal-external stability -and of the CWS model structure, the former property is shown to hold for the grand coalition provided that resource transfers of a specific form between countries are introduced. Further, while the latter property holds neither for the grand coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is verified for most small coalitions in a weak sense that involves transfers. Finally, it is shown that coalitions, stable in either sense, that perform best in terms of carbon concentration and global welfare, are always heterogeneous ones.
Introduction
The global public good character of combating the effects of climate change requires voluntary cooperation amongst countries if any improvement upon the laissez faire businessas-usual is sought for. Such cooperation, institutionalized in international environmental treaties, consists in joint actions decided and implemented by the signatory countries. Negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol represents the first legally binding agreement on climate. As such, it is now considered as a decisive step. However it is widely acknowledged that, in order to be environmentally effective, post-Kyoto agreements should include more countries and yield stronger carbon emission abatement. This twin issue (which countries and how much more abatement?) is at the heart of the on-going negotiation process that currently prepares, under the UNFCCC, for the post 2012 world climate regime.
Calling a "coalition" any set of countries thus joining their efforts against climate change, an abundant literature has developed over the last 15 years dealing with the issue of the likeliness of "stable" climate coalitions. In that literature, two stability concepts 1 are competing, and an early summary of that competition was reported in Tulkens (1998) with an update in Chander and Tulkens (2006) . Up to then, the confrontation of the two notions has been exclusively conceptual; leaving it to the reader to evaluate their respective merits.
In this paper we wish to make the comparison at another level, namely the one of applications with their implied policy relevance. For that purpose, we make use of a numerical integrated assessment model, namely the ClimNeg World Simulation (henceforth CWS) model, which lends itself to proceed fairly easily to the comparison we are interested in. Such a numerical approach of the coalitional stability problem has been initiated in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) , who actually introduced the CWS model and used it to explore one of the two conceptual theses just mentioned. This was followed and pursued in Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus (2006) , who explored with CWS the other thesis. By putting together these two explorations with an updated version of the CWS model, the present paper presents an explicit comparison, with the purpose of bringing to light the properties of potential coalitions in three respects: stability, climate performance and global welfare.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, it is methodological. By testing on the same integrated assessment model the two alternative game theoretic stability concepts, we better show their relative merits. Second, the paper contributes to the policy debate. Assessing the properties of alternative climate coalitions in a concrete numerical context gives a powerful justification for recommendations as to the size and nature (homogeneity vs heterogeneity) of possible climate coalitions. Moreover, by showing explicitly which transfers among countries are appropriate to stabilize efficient coalitions, the paper also identifies wider room for negotiation.
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 presents the reader with the basic game theoretic concepts involved in the coalition stability notions we wish to put to a test. Section 3 presents the CWS integrated assessment model, including the updated exogenous data it makes use of by now. Section 4 contains the main numerical results on the two alternative stability concepts when applied to the CWS model, and Sections 5 and 6 comment on the issues of homogeneity vs heterogeneity, aggregate welfare and environmental performance of alternative coalitions in that model. Some sensitivity analyzes are presented in Section 7 and the concluding Section 8 summarizes our main findings.
The conceptual framework 2.1 The climatic-economic model and its associated games
The methodology we are using requires to make precise the relationship between the economic model (CWS) and the games from which the alternative stability concepts are borrowed. In this section we deal with the game theoretic framework while the economic model will be described in Section 3.
Two categories of games are involved, namely cooperative and non-cooperative ones. In either case the players are the countries, each player's strategies are the values chosen for the economic decision variables and the players payoffs are the countries' welfare level at the end of that period. A family of n such strategies, one for each player, defines what we call in the following section ascenario. Among the many conceivable ones we shall deal with (i) the Nash equilibrium scenario, (ii) various scenarios of partial agreement Nash equilibrium with respect to given coalitions, and (iii) the Pareto efficient scenario.
Non-cooperative games are those that consider strategies enacted by individual players; they lead essentially to the Nash equilibrium concept. Cooperative games, by contrast, typically consider in addition the strategies chosen jointly by groups of players, usually called coalitions, that is, subsets of players (including singletons and the all players set). In either case the behavioral assumption is made that the strategy chosen by individual players as well as the strategies chosen jointly by coalitions result from payoff maximization over some feasible set: the individual payoffs in the non-cooperative setting, the joint payoffs of the coalition members in the cooperative setting, this joint payoff being called the worth of the coalition. In general, the core-stability theory focuses on strategies chosen jointly by the members of the grand coalition, that is, the set N of all players. The behavioral assumption just mentioned implies that, in the CWS model, N chooses the Pareto efficient scenario.
This scenario and the grand coalition that generates it are then said to be stable in the core sense if the scenario belongs to the core of a suitably defined cooperative game, that is, if it is such that (i) no individual player can reach a higher payoff by not adopting the strategy assigned to him in the efficient scenario and choosing instead the best individual strategy he could find; and (ii) no subset of players, smaller than N , can similarly do better for its members, that is, by rejecting the strategies assigned to them by the efficient scenario and adopting a strategy of their own. Consequently, the grand coalition N is called strategically stable and its scenario may rightly be dubbed self enforceable since no coalition can find a better one for its members.
Formally, let i refer to players (i = 1, . . . , n), S ⊆ N denote a coalition, let the scalar W (S) be the worth of coalition S and the vector W = (W 1 , . . . , W i , . . . , W n ) denote an imputation 3 . The imputation W will be said to belong to the core of the cooperative game if the individual payoffs W i satisfy the following property:
• Property CR: Coalitional rationality ∀S ⊆ N , i∈S W i ≥ W (S) Notice that this property implies:
To be complete, the formal statement of these two properties should further specify what are the players' strategies implicit in the right hand sides of these expressions, namely W ({i}) and W (S). In the former, the strategy and the ensuing payoff of player i are those of the Nash equilibrium scenario; in the latter, the worth of coalition S is the sum of the payoffs obtained by the members of S as they result from enacting the joint strategy that maximizes this sum; this is the scenario dubbed above partial agreement Nash equilibrium (PANE ) with respect to a coalition. 
Internal-external stability
Rather than focusing on strategies of the grand coalition, the internal-external stability theory considers any coalition S and the payoffs of its members at the corresponding PANE scenario
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. It then considers the strategies and the resulting individual payoffs that can be reached by every player along that scenario according to whether he is inside or outside of the coalition 6 . Being inside means for the player to follow the strategy he is assigned to within the coalition he is a member of, whereas being outside means behaving as a singleton, taking as given the behavior of the coalition he is not a member of as well as of the other players (assumed to behave as singletons too). A coalition S and the PANE scenario it 3 An imputation is any vector of individual payoffs W such that their sum is equal to the worth of the grand coalition, formally: i∈N W i = W (N ). By construction it is induced by an efficient strategy. 4 In a partial agreement Nash equilibrium with respect to a coalition, the coalition members are assumed, as usual, to maximize their joint payoffs; but it is assumed in addition -and this is not usual -that the players outside of the coalition choose, as singletons, the strategy that maximizes their individual payoff, given what the coalition and the other singletons do. The equilibrium concept derived from this assumption (called the "gamma" assumption) was introduced in Chander and Tulkens (1995) & as the essential building block of the "gamma core" concept they proposed, which is to be used hereafter. A powerful further justification of the assumption is provided in Chander (2003) . 5 Thus, the gamma assumption is used here too. 6 It is assumed that a player can only either join the coalition or remain alone.
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generates are then said to be stable in the internal-external sense if the scenario is such that no insider prefers to stay out of the coalition and no outsider prefers to join the coalition rather than stay aside. Consequently, the coalition S is called stable and its PANE scenario self enforceable, not by reference to alternative coalitions as in the preceding concept, but instead because of the structure of the individual motivations of the players within and outside the coalition. Formally, letting W i (S) denote the individual payoff of player i when coalition S is formed, this means that the payoffs satisfy the following two properties
Transfer schemes
It has often been suggested that when a coalition and its strategies are not stable, transfers of payoffs (of economic goods, in economic games) between players may induce stability. To what extent is this the case for each of the two forms of stability just defined?
In the context of the core-stability theory, transfers were proposed by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) for the standard game with multilateral externalities used to deal with international environmental agreements. They proved analytically that transfers formulated as follows induce the stability property.
Let W
N ash i
be the payoff of player i at the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game, that is, in absence of cooperation; and let 
with π i ≥ 0 ∀i such that i π i = 1. These transfers guarantee that each player receives a payoff at least equal to what it is in case of no cooperation and it divides the surplus of cooperation over non-cooperation according to weights π i . In the multilateral environmental model, each weight is equal to the ratio of player i's marginal damage cost over the sum over all players of such marginal damage costs. With these weights, the payoff vector
The internal-external stability concept originates in the work of d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) on the stability of cartels and has been imported in the literature on IEAs by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) . The way it is presented here -in particular its connection with the PANE concept -owes much to Eyckmans and Finus (2004) . 8 That W * (N ) + Ψ N is an imputation follows from the fact that (1) implies i∈N Ψ i = 0, i.e. the transfers budget balances.
is shown by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) to belong to the core of the game.
The internal-external stability theory proposes no specific transfer formula but introduces instead the notion of potentially internally stable coalitions. A coalition (of any size) is potentially internally stable if it can guarantee to all its members at least their free-rider payoff. For a given a coalition, the free-rider payoff of any of its members is the payoff the member would obtain in the PANE scenario w.r.t. that coalition if he would stay out and behave as a singleton in the face of that coalition.
Formally, for any coalition S, this reads as follows:
The free rider payoff of a player i vis-à-vis some coalition S -that is, each term of the sum in the right hand side of (2) -may be seen as the minimum payoff player i requires to remain a member of the coalition. Coalitions whose worth under their PANE is large enough to meet this requirement for all their members can thus be stabilized at least internally
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. The two approaches rest on different views when applied to international environmental agreements. The core-stability approach assumes that, if one or several countries attempt to free-ride on an efficient agreement with transfers, the other countries do not cooperate among themselves anymore, so as to make the free rider see that the country is better off by not free riding. This threat is what induces stability. In the internal-external stability approach, stability of an agreement within a coalition obtains if no individual country attempts to free-ride on it, assuming that free riding does not prevent the other countries from keeping cooperation among themselves.
The ClimNeg World Simulation model (CWS)

Overview of the model
The ClimNeg World Simulation model (CWS) is an integrated assessment model of climate change and optimal growth, adapted for coalitional analysis from Nordhaus and Yang (1996) . It encompasses economic, climatic and impact dimensions in a worldwide intertemporal setting. As a Ramsey-type model, growth is driven by population growth, technological change and capital accumulation. The time dimension is discrete, indexed by t, finite, but very long. The world is split into six countries/regions: USA, Japan, Europe
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, China, the Former Soviet Union and the Rest of the World. In each country/region 11 i = 1, ..., n gross output is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function combining capital and population. Population is exogenous. Capital accumulation comes from (endogenous) gross investment less (exogenous) scrapping. Technical progress is Hicks-neutral. Carbon emissions stem 9 By using the Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme introduced in Eyckmans and Finus (2004) . "Sharing scheme" indicates that the authors do not propose a particular solution but are interested instead in identifying a class of sharing rules that stabilizes all PIS coalitions. 10 Europe is defined as EU-15.
11 For short, we henceforth use only country.
6 from global output with an emission coefficient which can be reduced by national policies,
, where µ i,t ∈ (0, 1) stands for the carbon abatement rate and σ i,t is the exogenous carbon intensity of the economy. Abatement costs are given by an increasing and convex cost function C i (µ i,t ). Carbon emissions accumulate in the atmosphere. Concentration, through a simplified carbon cycle, yields a global mean temperature, expressed as temperature change with respect to pre-industrial level, ∆T t . The impacts of global warming in each country are considered through damage cost functions D i (∆T t ), increasing and convex. Thus, consumption is given by the gross output minus investment, abatement costs and damage costs,
The welfare of each country is measured as the aggregate discounted consumption until the end of the period.
The model is used to determine, over the period 2000-2300, paths of investment (I it ) and emissions (through µ it ) over time and, consequently, capital accumulation, carbon concentration, temperature change and finally consumption, all at the world and country levels.
This economic model is converted into a a six players game by letting the six countries be the six players, whose strategies are the decision variables I it ) and µ it over the entire period 2000-2300, and whose individual payoffs are their respective aggregate discounted consumptions until the end of the period, as they result from capital accumulation, carbon concentration and temperature change.
The players-countries strategies are specified according to three alternative scenarios. First, the Nash equilibrium scenario
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, which is the joint outcome of each country maximizing its welfare taking the actions of the others as given. Second, the partial agreement Nash equilibria with respect to a coalition scenarios 13 , each of which is the outcome of a subset of countries maximizing jointly their welfare, while the others act individually (there are as many such scenarios considered as there are coalitions). And third, the Pareto efficient scenario where all countries act jointly so as to maximize the world welfare.
The dynamic optimization problems whose solutions are the numerical values of each one of these scenatrios are stated in Table I in the appendix. Parameter values as well as initial values are gathered there also. The justification for (exogenous) discount rates equal to 1.5% in developed countries and 3.0% in developing ones is given in ET-03. 
Data set and calibration
In this paper we use an updated version of the CWS model. For two main sets of assumptions, time has revealed strong departing evolutions from what was expected a few years ago. These 12 In the terminology of dynamic noncooperative games, this is an open loop Nash equilibrium. Closed loop or feedback Nash equilibria have also been introduced in dynamic core-stability analysis in Germain, Toint, Tulkens and de Zeeuw 2003, albeit with a simpler model. An extension to the CWS model is still awaiting. 13 These are of open loop nature as well 14 The model runs under GAMS. All codes are available from the authors upon request.
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are population growth and technological progress. Table 1 in the appendix displays our assumptions, previous ones (those used in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) -ET-03 hereafter) and current ones. Some comments are given hereafter.
As far as population growth is concerned, the CWS model in ET-03 was using population forecasts of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) , which came from the United Nations. A positive growth was expected in every region. Our update is based on the latest publications of the United Nations, World Population to 2300 (2004) and World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2005) . At this horizon, world population is expected to reach 9 billion people, 1 billion less than the previous forecast. More important, the time profiles of various regions become more contrasted. Europe, Japan and China face a peak in their population between 2020 and 2030, or even before, and then experience a decline. The population in the Former Soviet Union is expected to decrease. In the USA, the population increase should be stronger than expected, mainly because of immigration and fertility rates. In the Rest of the World, short-term population growth would be stronger, but followed by a stronger slowdown. We assume that, in each country population size converges to a steady state value in the long run.
In the CWS model technological progress encompasses two elements, the global factor productivity and the carbon intensity of economic activity. As far as the former is concerned, high positive trends are expected for China and the USA, while lower progress would occur in Japan, the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Rest of the World (ROW). The most striking update concerns carbon intensities which have exhibited contrasting patterns in the recent years. Our data come from the International Energy Agency for carbon emissions and from the World Bank for GDP 15 . Apparently, stringent industrial adjustments are in place that could yield sharp decreases in carbon intensities. This is particularly true for China and FSU. On the contrary, recent trends in Japan and ROW suggest lower carbon improvements than expected. No major changes have been noticed for the EU and the USA in comparison with the former version of CWS.
This update has two main consequences for climate issues. Firstly, world emissions are lower in the business-as-usual scenario than they were in ET-03. But, secondly, heterogeneity among countries is reinforced: national emission profiles are lower in all countries, in particular in China, while the USA experiences higher emissions. The implication of this is that the relative weight of the different countries in the global issue has significantly changed, and so did the costs and benefits of each country to participate to a given climate agreement. As a consequence, these new economic patterns may have major implications on a country's attitude towards climate negotiations, towards the coalitions they might form and on the room for agreement 16 . 15 In fact, we use the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool of the World Resources Institute that gathers data from the International Energy Agency and the World Bank. 16 A complete description of the update is provided in Gerard (2006 Gerard ( , 2007 
Core-stability
Let us focus first on the results for the cooperative approach as they appear in Tables  2 and 3 . In either table, the first column contains a six digit key specifying the structure of the coalition: if a region is a member of the coalition, it obtains a "1" at the appropriate position in the key. For instance, the key "111111" refers to S = N = {U SA, JP N, EU, CHN, F SU, ROW }. Column 2 contains the worth of a coalition (that is the aggregate welfare of its members, W (S)) at its corresponding partial agreement Nash equilibrium and column 3 contains the total of what members of each coalition get at the efficient allocation, as achieved by the grand coalition without transfers (W * S = i∈S W * i ). Column 4 gives the difference between the values of the two previous columns. If this difference is negative, it means that S is worse off in the grand coalition. Column 6 gives the total amount of generalized GTT transfers for the coalition S (Ψ S = i∈S Ψ i ).
Comparing the two tables reveals that:
1. Without transfers, the world efficient allocation, which needs the grand coalition to be achieved, is not core-stable: 14 smaller coalitions (out of 63) can improve upon it in CWS 1.1 and 18 coalitions can do so in the updated version. Thus, in either case, the grand coalition without transfers cannot form. Note that among the 18 blocking coalitions in the update, 14 are all those that were blocking in CWS 1.1.
2. With transfers, the world efficient allocation is core-stable in either case. In CWS 1.2, the amount of the transfers is in general smaller except for the USA. This last result is in line with the two main consequences of the update as presented before: less emissions in every region (the extent of the externality is reduced) except in the USA.
The first result is especially important, as it confirms with two versions of the CWS model the possibility of achieving core stability of the world efficient allocation, thanks to GTT transfers. The concept thus appears as robust to updating. The presence of four newly blocking coalitions may be seen as revealing an increased instability of the efficient allocation without transfers. But this makes the transfers all the more necessary if efficiency is being sought in the international agreement. ). In particular, the grand coalition, that is, the one that would achieve the world efficient allocation without transfers, does not pass it. More coalitions (11, or 15, out of 56 -the grand coalition is irrelevant here) pass the ES test. No coalition passes both tests however, except for one, namely the couple USA, EU which does so only in CWS 1.2.
• Potential internal stability: Contrary to the IS and ES tests, the PIS test is one that implicitly refers to transfers within the coalitions, with the purpose of inducing internal stability. Here again, the grand coalition does not pass the test, but many smaller coalitions do in both CWS 1.1 and 1.2. More precisely, all of the five-country coalitions, 5 out of the 15 four-country coalitions and 2 out of the three-country coalitions did not pass the test in CWS 1.1. In the update, 4 five-country coalitions and 5 four-country coalitions do not pass the test whereas 1 five-country and all other coalitions of four countries or less do pass it, as revealed by Table 6 .
Core and internal-external stability compared
Considering the grand coalition N , we can report the following three results:
1. Without transfers, the world efficient allocation, that only the grand coalition can achieve, is lacking stability in both the core sense and the internal-external sense when computed with the CWS model.
2. By contrast, if transfers are introduced, the world efficient allocation achieved by N can be stabilized in the core sense, by means of GTT transfers within the grand coalition.
3. This is not possible in the internal-external sense, however, by means of PIS transfers.
The reason for this difference is in the logic that lies behind the two stability concepts: in the core case, stability of N is obtained from threatening the objecting parties to be deprived of any part in the surplus generated by the collective move to efficiency. In the internal-external stability case, stability should result from offering each country its free rider payoff; but it occurs that the surplus generated by the move to efficiency is insufficient for ensuring that to all countries. This is due to the structure of the economic model, not to the internal-external stability concept itself. As far as coalitions other than N are concerned, none of them can evidently be stable in the core sense because it is precisely the meaning of the core result that N with transfers can improve upon any of them. Concerning their stability in the internal-external stability sense, one finds in Tables 2 (or 3) and 4 hardly any correlation between those coalitions that meet either internal or external stability (coalitions with an 'x' in the IS or ES columns of Table 4 ) and those which could block in the core sense the efficient allocation without transfers (coalitions with a negative sign in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3 ). In short, this is because the reasons for blocking (which are, for the members of S, the hope to do better by themselves) are fundamentally different from those for free riding (which are the search for benefit from the others' actions). This last argument also explains why the PIS property prevails better with small coalitions: vis-à-vis a small coalition, there is little to free ride about (because the coalition does not achieve much), so that the surplus generated can be sufficient to deter from such behavior.
In summary, the core vs internal-external stability concepts have quite opposing properties, not only as to the grand coalition, N , but also for smaller ones. One concept excludes small coalitions, whereas the other concept can be found to be satisfied with small coalitions.
Stability vs performance
Can policy implications be derived from the above stability discussion and simulation results? In particular, how important are the coalitional stability properties we have identified? Should they serve as an argument to support or advocate specific structures for climatic international agreements such as small coalitions rather than large ones, or homogeneous rather than heterogeneous ones?
To answer these questions, let us consider two criteria measuring the global outcome resulting from an agreement, that is,
• the aggregate welfare level reached at the world level,
• the environmental performance achieved, expressed by atmospheric carbon concentration.
and consider how these are met by alternative coalition structures. This is done in Figure  1 with the numerical results of CWS 1.2. On the two axes, we use a welfare and an environmental index respectively, that we borrow from CEF-06. Both indexes give the value 1 to the world efficient allocation (the grand coalition case) that produces the highest aggregate welfare and the lowest carbon concentrations, and the value 0 to the non-cooperative Nash case, that depicts the lowest aggregate welfare and the highest carbon concentrations. Formally, the indexes are computed as follows:
• Welfare index:
where i∈N W i (S) and M 2300 (S) are respectively the aggregate welfare and carbon concentration levels in 2300 under the corresponding coalition structure S, while "*" refers to the world efficient allocation (full cooperation) and "Nash" refers to the Nash case (no cooperation). An increasing relation is obtained with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (lowest global welfare, highest carbon concentration) at the bottom left and the grand coalition (highest global welfare, lowest carbon concentration) at the top right.
Remembering that internal stability in its potential form prevails with small coalitions while core-stability is acháieved only with the largest one, the relation also depicts both the welfare and the environmental performances of alternative coalition sizes.
Clearly, accepting or recommending small coalition arrangements because of their potential internal stability virtues entails a loss on both counts, that striving for an efficient and core stable alternative could avoid. Internal stability thus appears to be a weakly desirable objective.
Is coalition homogeneity desirable?
A common argument in the climate policy debate is that developed countries should engage themselves first, after what developing countries would be invited to join the agreement and participate to the mitigation of global warming. Although this argument seems reasonable on the basis of historical responsibilities
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, one may question its effectiveness. In this section we analyze the how the composition of a coalition, that is, its degree of homogeneity, which is to be defined), affects its stability.
The regions/countries considered in the CWS model can be split into two categories:
• developed-Annex B countries (USA, EU and JPN), with high per capita emissions and GDP,
• developing-non-Annex B countries (CHN and ROW), with low per capita emissions and GDP, and low-cost abatement opportunities.
In the following we will talk about an heterogeneous coalition when a coalition is formed by countries coming from more than a single category. Conversely, an homogeneous coalition will designate a coalition formed by countries from a single category. The FSU will move as a free electron in this categorization as it offers the characteristics of both a developed country (high emissions per capita) and a developing one (low cost abatement opportunities, low GDP per capita). Accordingly, our 57 coalitions (excluding singletons) are broken down into 42 heterogeneous coalitions and 15 homogeneous ones. We examine the relation mentioned above, successively without and with transfers 
Environmental index
Welfare index
In the no transfer case, there appears to be more homogeneous stable coalitions after the update and less heterogeneous stable coalitions. Indeed on the one hand, in CWS 1.1 only 2 out of the 8 internally stable coalitions are homogeneous coalitions. With CWS 1.2, all the 4 homogeneous coalitions involving FSU and developing-non-Annex B countries pass now the IS test and the coalition {USA, EU} becomes both internally and externally stable.
On the other hand, in CWS 1.1, 6 of the 8 internally stable coalitions were heterogeneous coalitions(out of 42). With the update, two of these 6 heterogeneous coalitions still pass the IS test but those coalitions include only JPN as developed-Annex B country, which is the least important emitter of the six regions in both versions 19 . Moreover, in CWS 1.1, 4 coalitions involving at least one of the two main polluters in each category, that is, (USA or EU) and (CHN or ROW) passed the IS test. With the update, none of these coalitions passes this test anymore 20 . So, less heterogeneous coalitions are stable in the IS -ES sense after the update. In the same vein, finally, the grand coalition, clearly the largest heterogeneous one, is never core-stable without transfers in either version, with four more blocking coalitions after the update.
When the possibility of transfers is introduced, stability appears also to be enhanced by homogeneity after the update. In CWS 1.1, only 1 out of the 15 homogeneous coalitions did not pass the PIS test. That coalition, the Annex B coalition {USA, JPN, EU, FSU}
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, does satisfy the PIS property with the update. So it seems that there is more room for cooperation between these countries today than ten years earlier. Furthermore, with the update the Annex B coalition turns out to be more stable than the "Annex B without the USA" coalition
22
. Indeed, this latter coalition does not satisfy the ES property (the property was satisfied with CWS 1.1). This means that the United States would be better off by coming back to the Annex B coalition.
In CWS 1.1, 13 heterogeneous coalitions were not stable in the PIS sense. In CWS 1.2, this figure is only 11 but the composition of these coalitions has changed to some extent. Indeed, no four-country (or more) coalitions involving both the USA and the EU and at least one non-Annex B countries pass the PIS test after the update.
Homogeneity vs heterogeneity can also be analyzed by Figure 1 . One can see that the best (in terms of global welfare) homogeneous coalition, namely {CHN, FSU, ROW}, leads to far lower global welfare and far higher carbon concentrations than both the best heterogeneous coalition (the grand coalition) and the best heterogeneous coalition satisfying the PIS property, that is, {USA, JPN, CHN, FSU, ROW}. As a consequence, promoting homogeneous coalitions would lead to very low mitigation policies at the world level, unable to tackle climate change issue as heterogeneous (larger) coalitions could do.
Finally, there seems to be a trade-off between stability and environmental effectiveness. Homogeneity in climate coalitions fosters stability but is detrimental to climate effectiveness. 19 JPN is less important in terms of emissions than USA or EU and even more with the update. In CWS 1.1, JPN emission share in the emissions of its category evolves as follow: 12% in 2000, 14% in 2050 and 12% in 2200. In CSW 1.2, those figures are: 12% in 2000, 8% in 2050 and 6% in 2200. 20 Moreover, in both versions, none of the coalitions that involve the two main emitters of a category and at least one emitter of the other category is internally stable.
21 The so-called Old Kyoto coalition in CEF-06. 22 The so-called Present Kyoto coalition in CEF-06.
Sensitivity analyses
The objective of this section is to test to what extent our results are robust to the choice of some key parameters. Extensive sensitivity analyses have revealed that two assumptions may be key (Gerard, 2006) . The first one is the evolution of carbon intensity (σ i,t in equations of Table I ) in China in the forthcoming years, and the second one is the slope of the damage functions in all countries. China is expected to become the world largest carbon emitter soon, but when heavily depends on the assumption made on technological progress. In our model, carbon intensity and total factor productivity are calibrated and projected on the basis of past profiles, which yields a quite rapid -and optimistic -decarbonization of the Chinese economy in the forthcoming decades. As a first sensitivity analysis, we reduced the rate of decarbonization by half, while keeping the asymptotical value unchanged. This raises Chinese emissions by 60% in the business-as-usual scenario in 2100 while the level of emissions in the very longterm is kept unchanged. The fact that Chinese emissions are higher increases the climate externality generated (the effect of its own strategy on the other countries) and therefore the possible gain from cooperation. However, the free-riding incentive may also be stronger for the other countries in the coalitions including China because these coalitions will internalize a larger part of the global externality. Both effects potentially raise concern for stability.
The model shows that the gain in world welfare between the Nash equilibrium and the efficient scenarios is slightly increased by around 1%. Our main results on the core-stability of the grand coalition and the best PIS coalition (which includes China) still prevail. The effect on the stability of coalitions without China is negative: the difference between the aggregate welfare of the coalition and the sum of the free-riding claims of its members (definition of the PIS property) decreases for 23 out of the 26 coalitions considered; indeed, such coalitions internalize a smaller part of the externality. However, the effect on the coalitions including China is less clear: it increases for 16 out of 31 coalitions, but decreases for 18. In short, the model confirms the mechanisms at stake in this test and our main conclusions remain valid. The surprise may be that the effect on global welfare gain from cooperation is quite low.
The second sensitivity analysis concerns the damage functions. These, still borrowed from Nordhaus and Yang (1996) , bear major uncertainties. The relationship between global temperature increase and climatic impacts is highly difficult to quantify, and the most recent studies (including the Stern Review and the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report) seem to suggest higher damage sensitivity. We did this by increasing the exponent of the damage functions (θ i,2 in equations of Table I ) by 50% in all countries. Intuitively, this will reinforce the climate externality, and thus the desirability of cooperation. But, it is difficult to infer, a priori, the implication for stability because the free-riding incentive may also be stronger when the coalitions try to better internalize the climate externality.
After computation the CWS model confirms that the gain in global welfare associated with cooperation is stronger, and this time the increase is significant (the gain is three times higher). However, even with such a strong incentive for cooperation, our main results on core-stability of the grand coalition and the best PIS coalition remain valid. This means that the stronger gain from cooperation dominates the reinforcement of the free-riding incentives. No clear conclusion can be drawn about the impact on the stability of the other coalitions. Indeed, the difference between the aggregate welfare of the coalition and the sum of the free-riding claims of its members increases for 38 out of 57 coalitions, but decreases for 19 others, making 6 coalitions no more PIS. The increase concerns mainly small coalitions, for which we have already mentioned that there is less to free-ride about.
Conclusion
In the context of international climate agreements, two game theoretic approaches discuss the stability of climate coalitions, using different stability concepts. With the CWS model (recently updated), this paper numerically compares and contrasts the results obtained from either approaches. It turns out that transfers are required to ensure the stability of most coalitions whatever the concept used. But transfers are not equally successful to stabilize coalitions in both approaches because of the logic that lies behind the two concepts. More precisely, if transfers can make the grand coalition stable in the gamma-core sense, it is never the case in the internal-external sense; only smaller coalitions, where there is less to free-ride about, are found stable in this sense, with transfers. Moreover we note that homogeneity among the members of a coalition appears to help the potential internal stability of a coalition. But the global outcome in terms of aggregate welfare or environmental performance as reached by small or homogeneous coalitions is far less attractive compared with the heterogeneous world efficient allocation. Thus, according to our simulations, promoting small or homogeneous coalitions for internal stability purposes is not a desirable recommendation. 
